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BROWN, his wife; VALLEY BANK
13742
& TRUST COMPANY; Z I O N S
BANK & TRUST; SOUTHLAND
CORPORATION (7-11 Stares),
Defendants and Respondents. )

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a condemnation action by the Utah State
Road Commission to acquire certain real property along
5300 South Street in Salt Lake County for the purpose
of constructing an expressway thereon.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was tried before a jury, Judge Joseph
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G. Jeppson, presiding. The state appeals from the Judgment on the Verdict.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant State, seeks reversal of the Judgment on the Verdict of the lower court together with an
order that the case be remanded for a new trial.
»,
|

STATEMENT OF FACTS

By this action the Utah State Road Commission
sought to acquire property to widen 5300 South Street
in Salt Lake County in order to build an expressway west
from the 1-15 freeway.
The subject tract was improved with a store built
by the owner Mr. Brown which was leased together with
about one fourth of the total tract to the tenant Southland Corporation (7-11 Stores). The state acquired approximately 0.4 of an acre in fee and easements in a strip
from the front portion of the tract in order to widen 5300
South. I t also limited the access to 5300 South to two
designated openings. While the store building itself was
not taken both the owner's and state's appraisers assessed
severance damages due to the taking.
At the trial Mr. Charles Saxton, fee appraiser for the
owner defendant Brown, gave his opinion of just compensation. His opinion, was based on the fair market value of
land and improvements with the present value of the
tenant's lease added over and above which substantially
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enhanced and increased the total value of the premises
over the uencumbered fee value in Mr. Saxton's mind.
Mr. Edward Pack, witness for Southland Corporation
(7-11) testified as to the original cost, depreciated value
and present worth of certain equipment which included
personal property. Mr. Pack also testified as to the rental income from various 7-11 Stores as well as the particular store in question.
Mr. Jerry Webber, fee appraiser, testified for Southland Corporation (7-11) as to value of the lease hold interest based solely on information supplied by 7-11 stores.
While he offered no evidence at all as to market value
of the subject property, Mr. Webber was willing to testify
to three separate figures for present value of the lease
interest. He then clarified that in his opinion two of
those figures were wrong.
The state submits that defendants' method of appraisal together with testimony of the value of the lease
interest totally separate and apart from fair market
value of the property resulted in a verdict contrary to
law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF VALUATION OF A LEASEHOLD
INTEREST TO BE ADDED OVER AND
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4
ABOVE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Mr. Charles Saxton testified for the landowner, defendant Brown as to the market value of the subject property which was encumbered by a lease to the tenant defendant Southland Corporation for their 7-11 store. While
several items of evidence were elicited from Mr. Saxton
during cross examination which were clearly incompetent,
the court chose to deny the state's motion to strike his
testimony (T. 88).
The most glaring error complained of in this appeal
is that Mr. Saxton was obviously allowed to tack on the
value of the leasehold interest over and above his own
opinion of fair market value of the subject property. Mr.
Saxton first testified that the fair market value of the
land was $1.25 per square foot (T. 67, 93, 94). At page
67 of the transcript is the following testimony:
"A. I took into consideration first what the
property indicated the value was per square foot
of the property.
Q. And what was that?
A. The land, a $1.25.
Q. OK, now that would be raw land without a lease.
A. Yes sir."
Then for the value of the lease-hold interest Mr.
Saxton calculated separate and apart what a purchaser

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
would pay for the land under lease. The result is an increase of 11 cents to a $1.36 per square foot (T. 70).
Clearly Mr. Saxton estimated a fair market value of the
land then added an increment for the lease of 11 cents
over and above the fair market value for each of the
66,864.6 square feet in the total tract of subject property
(T. 68), even though only one fourth of the total tract or
about 16,000 square feet was actually leased (T. 155).
Similarly, according to Mr. Saxton the value of the building on the property was worth $33,584.82 without a lease,
but with a lease the building became worth $64,709.54
(T. 70).
The result is that Mr. Saxton estimates the total
value of the unencumbered subject property before the
taking at "around $90,000" but the value of the same
property with the lease is estimated at over $156,000
(T. 109, 110). Mr. Saxton has apparently coined an unprecedented recipe for instant wealth: Take fee property, add a lease, and presto! The market value has increased over 75%. It is doubtful that such financial magic
is so effective other than in a condemnation action. While
it is proper to solve the condemnation problem with a
lease clause between the owner and his tenant, Mr. Saxton's procedure is faulty because it allows the parties to
establish their own fair market value merely by manipulating the terms of the lease as to rent paid and period
of the lease.
The implication of this method is as obvious as the
method is inaccurate. It is erroneous to calculate the fair
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market value of the property and then add thereto the
separated value of the leasehold interest in order to
arrive at a total "before value" of the property. Rather*
the correct method of valuation is to find the fair market
value of the whole tract upon a sale to a buyer knowledgeable in the market place, then determine the amount of
just compensation and apportion that award between
the owner and the tenant. The law is clear as to the
method of determining the value of the property when
an owner and a tenant are involved. A leading authority
on eminent domain matters states the law in these terms:
In the valuation process, a property is appraised as if it were not subject to various own,>fi ership interests; the fact that it may be subject
to leasehold interests is ignored. The justification for this view is that what is being taken
is the property as a whole, not the sum of the
separate interests in it. Parties cannot claim
that their interests are worth more when valued
separately and demand further compensation.
This policy creates a defined, limited fund
out of which all those with an interest in the
property must be paid. Once this is done a condemnor steps out of the picture and the interested parties must compete for as large a share
of the available award they can get. Given the
limited nature of the fund it is obvious that the
more any one party gets, the less there is to be
distributed among the other claimants. Nichols
on Eminent Domain, § 11.01. CrCt- 7 ,
pu~4
Other authorities concur that the law does not permit valuation by the sum of the interests involved.
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When there are different interests or estates
in the property, the proper course is to ascertain
the entire compensation as though the property
belonged to one person and then apportion this
sum among the different parties according to
their respective rights. The value of property
cannot be enhanced by any contract arrangements among the owners of different interests.
Whatever advantage is secured to one interest
must be taken from another and the sum of the
parts cannot exceed the whole. J. Lewis, Eminent Domain § 716 (3rd Edition) as quoted in
Rams, Valuation for Eminent Domain, 1973, p.
256.
Where leased property is taken by eminent
domain, it is ordinarily valued as though held
in a single ownership rather than by separately
evaluating the interest of the lessor and lessee,
and the compensation for the property taken or
injured is then apportioned between the lessor
and lessee according to their respective interests
. . . As in the case of apportionment of awards
generally . . . the condemnor ordinarily has no
interest in the apportionment of the award between the lessor and the lessee. 29A, C. J. S.
Eminent Domain § 198.
While Utah law has no case directly in point on
this matter the Utah Supreme Court has expressed its
concurrence with the general law as set forth above. In
referring to the awarding of damages to the tenant the
Supreme Court said:
"Whatever damage he sustained should have
been deducted from the total value of the land
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taken and the severance damages sustained. The
rules regarding the respective interests of lessees
and lessors are set out in 29A C. J. S. Eminent
Domain § 198." Ogden City v. Stephens, 445
P. 2d 703, 21 Utah 2d 336.
The Supreme Court of Colorado has approved the
same procedure for apportionment of an award between
landlord and tenant.
The Supreme Court held that the state was
entitled to acquire the entire property upon payment of the reasonable market value of the real
estate plus damages to the residue at the time of
the taking. This market value is to be ascertained in a gross amount which will thereafter
be apportioned between the lessor and the lessee
in accordance with their respective interests.
City of Sterling v. Plains Investment Company,
511 P. 2d 512 (Colo. 1973).
Another Colorado case clarifies the law on this issue.
In quoting from a Missouri Supreme Court decision the
Colorado Court quoted with approval as follows:
. . . the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected
the argument made by a lessee of real estate
which was being taken for public use that he was
entitled to a separate assessment of damages
on account of the loss of his leasehold interest.
The Missouri court held that the proper course
was to ascertain the entire compensation as
though the property belonged to one person and
then to apportion this sum among the persons
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having rights therein as their respective interests appeared.
*

*

*

Once the reasonable market value of property subject to eminent domain proceedings has
been established, the apportionment of that
amount among persons claiming an interest therein is a matter of no concern to the condemnor.
Vivian v. Board of Trustees of Colo. School of
Mines, 383 P. 2d 801 (Colo. 1963).
The law of the State of New York also holds that
the proper method is to first ascertain the award based
on the property as if it were unencumbered and then to
apportion that amount among all the interests which are
held in the property.
Generally speaking, where there are two or
more interests or estates in a condemned parcel
the proper mode of assessing damage is to ascertain first the damage to the fee as if it were unencumbered, and then to apportion that amount
among all of the estates and interests which are
held in the property. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Company v. State, 238 N. E. 2d 705 (N. Y.
1968).
Thus, it can be seen from the law as quoted above
that the correct procedure for the court to use is to base
the award on the value of the tract of property as owned
by a single person unencumbered and as the value is set
by a market transaction to a willing buyer. Subsequently,
the court must determine the apportionment of that
award between the interested parties. This procedure
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was clearly not followed in this case and therefore the
verdict should be reversed and remanded with instructions to follow the law.
The instructions Nos. 12, 16, 16B and 17 were delivered by the court to the jury (R. 413 thru 428). They
were objected to by counsel for the State (T. 388 thru
390). They are an erroneous statement of the law and
only served to confuse the jury. The instructions caused
the jury to separately assess the damages caused to the
owners and lessee as well as to assess the effect of the
lease on the market value of the property. Moreover,
Instruction No. 24 requires the jury to base their conclusion of Just Compensation on "what defendants have
lost" (R. 428). Clearly the correct measure of value is
what a willing buyer would pay for the property, not
whatever loss may be peculiar to these particular defendants. To the contrary the court refused the state's
proffered Instruction No. 37 (R. 500) which the state
feels is a more correct definition of the law as set forth
above. •
Thus, it is clear that the testimony before the jury
together with the instructions by the court confused the
jury and in effect compelled them to apply an incorrect
method of arriving at the value of the subject property
by adding the interests of the various parties involved.
All witnesses testified that the owner was receiving
less rental per month on his contract than similar properties were renting for in the market. Thus, this particu-
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lar lease was one favorable to the tenant Southland Corporation, but unfavorable to the owner since he could
have leased his unencumbered property for more in the
market. Mr. Saxton testified that in his experience,
. . . men will pay more, much more, for a piece
of property which has a long-term lease on it
by a reputable company which is obligated to
pay that lease over that period of time, than what
lie would for just the land and the building.
There is a value to the lease there (T. 107).
Mr. Saxton's testimony is thus tantamount to claiming that a buyer of the whole tract under lease would pay
a lease enhanced value of $156,000 in order to have the
privilege of having a steady income even though thait
income is much less than the market would provide if
the same buyer bought similar but unencumbered property for $90,000 and leased it in the market for the higher
rental figure. Such a rationale could only be possible when
the contract rental income is higher than market rental
so the buyer would purchase a lease favorable to the
owner. A prudent investor simply will not invest more
for a guarantee to receive less.
Contrary to his own rationale, Mr. Saxton had to
admit that where the lease is unfavorable to the owner
(a lease at less than market ffintal)a willing buyer would
pay less for the leased property than for the unencumbered property because he can lease the unencumbered
property for more in the market (T. 115, 116). Mr.
Webber, a witness for tenant Southland Corporation
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(7-11) also admitted that upon the sale of two similar
properties the one unencumbered, the other encumbered
by a lease unfavorable to the owner, a prudent and
knowledgeable buyer would choose the unencumbered
property because he could lease it immediately for the
higher market rent (T. 229),
On the other hand, the witness for the state appraised
the property from the standpoint of the rental value of
the whole tract in the market. Mr. Ray Williams, expert
witness for the State testified that since his appraisal was
based on market and not contract rent all interests were
represented and compensated for in his opinion of market
value (T. 326).
When state's counsel attempted to inquire as to the
propriety in good appraisal practice of assigning separate
values to different interests, the court summarily dismissed the question as asking for a legal conclusion. The
court was wrong — an expert appraiser should be able
to testify relative to good appraisal techniques (T. 327).
The point is that a lease bringing in less than the
market rental is not attractive to a buyer, does not enhance the value of the subject property and in no way
is it a benefit for which a prudent person would pay a
premium over and above the unencumbered fee value.
Mr. Saxton's testimony was an incorrect application of
appraisal theory, it confused the jury and the verdict
must therefore be reversed.
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POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED WHEN I T ALLOWED
TESTIMONY FROM THE TENANT SOUTHLAND CORPORATION (7-11) AS TO THE
VALUE OF THE LEASEHOLD INTEREST
SEPARATE AND APART FROM ANY TOTAL VALUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Defendant Brown purchased the property and constructed thereon a building in accordance with the standards of Southland Corporation for the operation of a
7-11 store (T. 148). He subsequently leased to Southland
Corporation the building and about one-fourth of the
subject property (T. 155). All witnesses agreed that the
lease rental at about $400 per month was less than the
market value of similar property at about $500 per month.
Mr. Pack, zone manager for the Southland Corporation (7-11) was allowed to testify over the states continuing objection as to a lease and business operation (T.
161, 162), in August of 1973 (T. 172, 173), with complete
disregard to the total value of the subject property or
the correct date of valuation. In fact, Mr. Pack had never
even estimated value of the subject property (T. 178) because his figures were for the lease alone and all testimony
was directed at 'today's" values. He had never formed
an opinion as of the correct valuation date (T. 184).
Also over continued objection and proffer of proof
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by the state Mr. Jerry Weber was allowed to testify for
the tenant Southland Corporation (7-11) as to the value
of the lease entirely separate and apart from the market
value of the subject property (T. 191, 200, 224). The
state submits that with the other testimony from the
owner and together with the court's instructions the jury
was confused and in order to compensate the tenant for
his interests the jury was compelled to add the lease
value over and above the fair market value of the property. Such procedure is error.
While it is entirely proper that the landowner and
tenant should be compensated for their interest in the
subject property, the law does not allow the total of that
compensation to exceed the value of the subject property
in its status of unencumbered fee owned by a single individual:
"There is only one proceeding to deterrnine
the value of the property taken and the damages
to the residue. The court did not in any manner
deprive [defendant] of its rights to present any
evidence that it had as to the value of the fee
and damage to the residue. The court did refuse to allow (defendant] to present evidence
bearing only upon the value of the leasehold.
This evidence may be presented by [defendant]
at a subsequent hearing at which [delendant]
can present any relevant and material evidence
it might have as to the value of the leasehold."
City of Sterling v. Plains Investment Company,
511 P. 2d 512 (Colorado 1973).
Utah law reveals no case in point; nevertheless, this
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court has expressed an indication of its concurrence with
the above statement of the law:
"However, whatever damage [defendantJ
sustains should have been deducted from the
total value of the land taken and the severance
damages sustained. The rules regarding the respective interests of lessees and lessors are set
out in 29A C. J. S. Eminent Domain, § 198,
Ogden City v. Stephens, 445 P. 2d 703, 21 Utah
2d 336."
Thus, the Utah Court has indicated that the proper
rule to follow should be according to the general rule of
law as set forth below:
"Where lease property is taken by Eminent
Domain it is ordinarily valued as though held
in a single ownership rather than by separately
valuing the interests of the lessor and lessee, and
the compensation for the property taken or injured is then apportioned between the lessor
and lessee according to their respective interests.
As in a case of apportionment of awards generally . . . the condemnor ordinarily has no interest in the apportionment of the award between
the lessor and lessee." 29A C. J. S. Eminent Domain § 198.
While it might be contended that a leasehold interest
under certain special conditions enhances the value of
the total tract beyond its unencumbered fee value such
a lease would necessarily be one favorable to the owner
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and thus attractive to a prospective buyer who would
take the owner's place, but not a lease as in the instant
case which is favorable only to the tenant and therefore
unattractive to a prospective buyer who for his money
can get a higher return from similar but unencumbered
property in the market.
Moreover, Mr. Weber's testimony is somewhat confusing to the jury. He testified that his opinion of the
market value of the lease was $16,867 (T. 200). Yet he
testified to another value of the lease based on Mr. Pack's
testimony as being $44,645.56 (T. 201), and yet another
value of $38,112.06 if based on a different "assumed rent
differential" (T. 201, 203). However, Mr. Weber then
proceeded to testify that he didn't agree with the latter
figures, that he was just asked to compute it and that in
his opinion he thought "it was wrong" (T. 225). Thus,
Mr. Weber was allowed to base his "expert" opinion on
the facts presented by Mr. Pack who in turn based has
information on the figures from computer lists, and then
to present three different values to the jury. His testimony is an excellent example of the difficulty in allowing
apportionment of award to become involved in the initial
condemnation trial.
Another problem with Mr. Weber's testimony is that
he failed to recognize the valuation date as set by law,
December 22,1971 and arbitrarily chose the date of August 8, 1973 (T. 220, 225) which is irrelevant and by his
own testimony necessitates an adjustment in his values
by more than 20% to conform to the correct date (T.
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235). Moreover, Mr. Weber's testimony was not independent since his father did 50% of the work and signed
the report (T. 218), and since the report was based not
on an independent investigation but solely on information, facts and figures furnished by defendant Southland
Corporation (7-11) (T. 221).
The state submits that the testimony of Mr. P&ck
and Mr. Weber only served to confuse the jury by placing before them three or more different figures for the
value of the lease, together with testimony that at least
some of those figures were wrong, thus causing the jury
to speculate as to the different interests of owner and
tenant. The state submits that such testimony is unprofessional and incompetent and was elicited only in an
attempt to make the lower figures look more appealing
to the jury. The verdict being based on such evidence
should be reversed and the case remanded for another
trial controlled by the correct principels of law. Instructions should also be given to first determine just compensation between owner and tenant and then subsequently apportion that award by agreement or by the
court without involvement of the condemnor.
POINT III.
THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE BECAUSE
OF THE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING AS
TO THE LAW AND CONFUSION OF EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE
REVERSED.
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Mr. Saxton's testimony as to severance damage was
the highest figure presented at trial: $45,111.51 (T. 83,
84). However, the jury returned a verdict of $53,378.00
for severance damages (T. 392, R. 397), a figure substantially in excess of any severance damage testimony at
trial. Such excessive testimony is contrary to law and
must be reversed.
The law as to severance damage clearly says that
a verdict cannot stand when it is
. . . clearly and palpably, or flagrantly, against
the weight of the evidence; or . . . it appears that
the jury have committed gross and palpable
error or have acted under improper bias, influence, or prejudice, or have mistaken the rules of
law stating the measure of damages, or have
rendered a verdict so excessive as to shock the
enlightened conscience of the court. 27 Am.
Jur. 2d Eminent Domain, § 471.
The controlling case in Utah is State v. Silliman, 22
Utah 2d 33, 448 P. 2d 347. In Silliman the verdict as to
severance damages to the remainder was higher than the
testimony at trial. On appeal that verdict was reversed
and the case remanded because the verdict was excessive.
In Silliman this court said:
"The trial judge realized that the amount
of severance damages awarded exceeded the highest figure of any witness, so he reduced the figure
to $12,487.50, the amount testified to by all
three witnesses for the landowner. Even after
this reduction the severance damages to the
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grazing land not taken amounted to $32.00 per
acre which is $3.00 per acre more than the jury
had fixed as the value of the better land taken.
*
:

;ii

*

*

The instant case is a good illustration that
the verdict cannot stand when it clearly shows
that it was given either under the influence of
passion and prejudice or under a lack of understanding of the law as it applies to severance
damages.
The trial court abused its discretion in not
granting a new trial. The judgment of the trial
court is reversed, the verdict of the jury is set
aside and the case is remanded for new trial."
State v. Silliman, supra.

In Silliman the severance damage per acre exceeded
the land value per acre awarded and the case was reversed.
In the instant case severance damage award exceeded
any testimony at trial by almost 20%. The state submits
that as in Silliman the instant case is a good illustration
that a verdict cannot stand when given under a lack of
understanding of law applicable to severance damages.
In this case the excessive verdict can only be the
result of confusion and lack of understanding of the law.
In a condemnation trial the only proper issue before the
jury is that of just compensation to the landowner which
consists of the fair market value of the land and improvements and any severance damages to the remainder. Allowing the landowner and tenant to fight over the value
of separate interests and whether to deduct or add those
interests to fair market value only serves to introduce
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extraneous, irrelevant and incompetent material which
should properly be a subject of a separate and subsequent hearing.
The erroneous instructions helped to confuse the
jury as to the law. The court rejected the state's proffered instruction (T. 387, R. 500) and instead gave instructions No. 12 (R. 413), No. 16 (R. 417), No, 16B
(R, 419) and No. 17 (R. 420) to which the state took
exception (T. 389). When taken together with the evidence allowed at trial these instructions clearly called for
the different interests to be valued separately and then
added together in order to arrive at the fair market value
of the subject property. That counsel for the defendant
landowner also misunderstood the law is shown in his
closing argument:
I t is now my privilege to spend the next few
minutes indicating to you why I feel that your
award should be in the sum of the total amount
that Mr. Brown has been damaged and the total
amount that 7-11 Stores have been damaged by
reason of this highway department taking here.
*

*

*

. . . as we analyze these instructions your work
is not that hard because what the court has in
effect told you in the instructions is that both
Mr. and Mrs. Brown here and 7-11 Stores have
some interest in that property at the time they
condemned it, and if you add these two interests
together in effect you will arrive at the fair market value of the property interests that were
taken (T. 339, 340).
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Counsel clearly indicates his understanding (or misunderstanding) that fair market value is arrived at by a
sum of the separate interests involved. This method is
contrary to law.) But the most significant factor recognized is that in this hearing the jury was so confused by
evidence from both landowner and tenant together with
erroneous instructions that the verdict actually resulted
in $53,378 damage figure while the highest testimony on
that item was $45,111.51. The true limit on severance
damage should be even lower because Mr. Saxton assumed that the lease ran to every square foot of the subject property when actually only about one-fourth of the
property was leased (T. 155). His figure for severance
damage would have been smaller had he been thorough
in his appraisal and aware of the actual size of the leased
area (T. 119). For this reason alone the jury verdict
should be reversed and the case remanded for trial before a jury which has a correct understanding of the application of law regarding severance damages.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY BEFORE THE JURY AND INSTRUCTING
THE JURY TO DETERMINE ITS VALUE.
Mr. Pack was Zone Manager of 7-11 Stores for the
defendant Southland Corporation. Mr. Pack had no
information to offer regarding the value of the subject
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property itself and therefore should not have been allowed to even testify in this hearing. His testimony properly would have been the subject of a separate and subsequent hearing to divide the award between the landowner and the tenant.
Nevertheless, over the state's numerous and continuing objections (T. 160 to 163) Mr. Pack was allowed
to testify as to business operations (T. 161), as to equipment without knowing the difference between fixtures
and personal property (T. 168, 181), as to equipment
value taken from computer listings of prices (T. 170),
with all his testimony directed to the date of termination
of operation in August 1973 (T. 172, 173), not the correct date of valuation on December 22,1971.
The state submits that the admission of the above
testimony was error. Business operations, profit and
losses per se are not properly part of an eminent domain
action. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain, 285, 29A C. J,
S., Eminent Domain, 162. The valuation date is set by
law at the date of service of summons, 78-34-11 Utah
Code Annotated, and testimony not directed to that date
is incompetent and without foundation.
But the most serious error complained of here is
that of allowing testimony of personal property before
the jury. Over the state's objection (T. 166 to 169) Mr.
Pack was allowed to testify to equipment. He could not
say whether the equipment was fixtures, personal property or a combination: "I don't know whether you call
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it personal or what" (T. 168). He also testified to various irrelevant and incompetent values, $17,254.31 (T.
170), $8,230.00 (T. 171), $4,100.00 (T. 173), $2,000 and
$1,000 (T. 174). Which of the five different figures was
his final value was never established, yet the court not
only allowed the testimony but instructed that the jury
could find damage to the personalty in Instruction 17-A:
"in addition you may award damages to the Southland
Corporation (7-11 Stores) for personal property . . ."
Moreover the jury was required to find a value for personalty on the "supplemental verdict" form (R 399).
The supplemental verdict form clearly shows that
the jury found the value of the personal property to be
$1400 and that the verdict for property attached to the
building was $1200 (R. 399, T. 393); even Mr. Pack testified that only $1,000 of equipment was attached to the
building (T. 174).
On the other hand the court rejected the state's
proffered Instruction No. 36 which is an accurate statement of the law as follows:
INSTRUCTION No. 36
The law providing for the taking of property by eminent domain and the awarding of
damages therefor speaks in term of real property and the damages to be awarded for its
taking. The condemnor acquires no interest in
the personalty; therefore, the obligation of the
state is limited to the payment of fair value of
the land taken plus resulting damages to the
remainder; the value or cost of removal of per-
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* sonal property is not an item of damages to be
separately valuated and paid for. The fact that
defendants had personal property on the premises of whatever nature and amount is merely an
incidental fact which they must reckon with and
take care of their interests therein (R. 499),
Legitimate fixtures are properly valued as part of the
real estate only when they enhance the value of improvements and not separately. State v. Papanikolas, 19 Utah
2d 153, 427 P. 2d 749. But to allow a direct valuation of
personal property in a condemnation action is error. Utah
Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P. 2d
917, The State never alleged the taking of personal property and such property is not correctly before the court
in an action to acquire real estate. In fact the condemnation statute 78-34-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated does
not even contemplate or authorize the taking of personalty.
An Alabama case involving a similar store and equipment reversed a lower court decision which had allowed
evidence of personal property. The law is well expressed
as follows:
The trial court erred in failing to sustain
objections to the questions relating to personal
property in the store building. * * * The
basic constitutional principle is that there must
be an actual taking of property or property rights
before compensation is required. * * * There
is, in this state, no constitutional provision or
statute requiring compensation for damages of
personal property in a condemnation of realty.
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* * * There was no attempt or application
to condemn any personal property. The order
of condemnation did not include any personal
property.
No section of our State Constitution and
no statutes authorizes payments for personal
property located in a building which is condemned
for state highway purposes.
"No allowance can be made for personal
property, as distinguished from improvements
or fixtures located on the condemned premises."
29A C. J. S. Eminent Domain, § 175 (1), Page
740. "A taking by eminent domain does not include personal property lying on the premises
taken, but not affixed thereto and it is held in
many cases that damages for injury to such personal property or the expense of removing it
from the premises taken are not proper elements
of compensation. * * *" 27 Am. Jur. 2nd
Eminent Domain, § 293, Page 103, as cited in
r State v. Woodham, 264 So. 2d 166 (Ala. 1972).
The state submits that the testimony of Mr. Pack
was not proper in the first place, however, the state also
submits that the figures on the equipment also were incompetent and only served to confuse the jury as indicated by the verdict in excess of the testimony. Therefore, this case must be revetted and remanded to the
lower court with instruction that personalty is not a part
of this action and that fixtures are properly valued only
as they enhance the value of the improvements. To
affirm an award solely for personal property as was allowed by the lower court in this action clearly is contrary
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to law, is against the policy of the statutes on Eminent
Domain and would be a highly dangerous and confused
precedent for future condemnation cases,
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
STATE'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE INCOMPETENT TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S WITNESS.
After the direct examination of Mr. Saxton, the
State moved to strike Mr. Saxton's testimony (T. 88).
The motion was again renewed out of the presence of
the jury (T. 117). The motion was denied by the court.
While striking the entire testimony of the witness
is a severe course of action, the state submits that it is
proper where most, if not all, of what the witness has
testified to is found to be incompetent or without foundation.
The qualification of an expert witness is to
be determined by the trial judge, and if he determines that a witness by reason of training
and experience can assist the jury by giving an
opinion on the matter properly before the court,
we on appeal should not hold that testimony
should be stricken unless such palpable ignorance
of the subject matter is manifested by the witness as to indicate an abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial judge in allowing the witness
to express an opinion in the first place or in refusing to grant a motion to strike after it is
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given. State Road Commission v. Silliman, 448
R 2d 347, 22 Utah 2d 33.
Mr. Saxton's testimony was objectionable and should
have been stricken as a matter of law for the following
reasons; Mr. Saxton didn't define fair market value or
highest and best use. He relied on incompetent sales
to the Road Commission (T. 92), sales he did not know
the terms of (T. 144), and inter-family conveyances (T.
138, 145) in order to establish his opinion of value. His
dates of valuation are entirely related to 1973, that is,
August 1, 1973 for the lease (T. 72) and September 1,
1973 for the building (T. 97), rather than the correct
date in December of 1971. His valuation of the lease is
based upon the entire property whereas only one-fourth
of the property was actually leased and he in effect admitted that a difference in the amount of property would
make a difference in his opinion (T. 119).
Most glaring of all, however, was Mr. Saxton's mistaken willingness to determine fair market value of the
property and then add thereto his estimate of the lease
value for land and building which almost doubled the
value of the subject property from $90,000 to $156,000
(T. 109, 110). This testimony, when taken into consideration with the other defendant's witnesses at trial allowed the jury to speculate and to potentially award the
value of the lease both to Mr. Brown as well as to defendant Southland Corporation.
The state submits that when Mr. Saxton's testimony
is so replete with mistaken assumptions, incorrect meth-
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ods and obviously erroneous conclusions, then, in this
particular case it demonstrates that type of ignorance
which under the law justifies a motion to strike,
CONCLUSION
The most serious problem complained of in this
appeal is that evidence of the value of the leasehold interest was placed before the jury irrespective of its connection with the value of the total tract of the subject
property as well as over and above the fair market value
of the property. Moreover the instructions of the court
confused the jury until they were in effect compelled to
establish just compensation by adding the full value of
the property together with the present value of the lease.
Mr. Saxton clearly added the value of the lease over
and above the market value of the subject property. Thus
in his opinion, he compensated the owner for the entire
loss of the lease. The testimony of Mr. Pack and Mr.
Weber taken together clearly were intended to establish
a separate value (or values) for the lease over and above
any amount awarded to the land owner. Thus, in their
opinion, they asked for compensation to Southland Corporation (7-11) for the entire value of the lease separate
from any value of the property itself.
To allow all this testimony at the trial to determine
fair market value and just compensation is erroneous
and confusing to the jury as to just what interests to
compensate and how those interests relate to the total
value of the property. The result was that the jury in
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effect was asked to pay twice for the value of the lease
over and above the value of the taking and damages and
actually did award severance damage clearly in excess of
that testified to by any witness.
Moreover, the court had absolutely no legal basis
for allowing evidence of personal property before the jury,
much less for instructing the jury that they could find
damage to personal property and then in effect requiring
the jury to fill in the supplemental verdict form. While
the court may not agree with the law, or even like the
law it should at least attempt to follow the law.
For the reasons set forth in this brief the state submits that the evidence, instructions and methods of appraisal allowed at trial were in error, that to allow each
interest to be compensated separate and apart from and
over and above the market value of the property is wrong.
Therefore, the state respectfully requests that the verdict be reversed and the case remanded to the lower court
with appropriate instructions to arrive at the true and
correct award of just compensation in this case.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN s. MCALLISTER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for
Plaintiff-Appellant
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